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Abstract 
 
  
This paper focuses on the conquest of Granada from 1482 to 1492. This period marked 
the end of independent Muslim rule in Iberia and the final capture of land lost to the first Muslim 
invaders in the year 711. The conquest of Granada under Ferdinand and Isabella reflected the 
modernization of warfare that occurred across Europe beginning in the fourteenth century. In 
particular Ferdinand's army was larger and composed of far more infantry than previous 
crusading armies in Iberia, and it effectively deployed gunpowder siege artillery to assault the 
formerly impregnable defenses of Granada. Ferdinand emerged from the crusade with a modern 
and well-trained army that was under his authority, not the dispersed authority typical of feudal 
levies. 
 Since the conquest of Granada was fought as a crusade, the culmination of centuries of 
religious conflict, it is unsurprising that the Catholic Church played an active role in supporting 
Ferdinand and Isabella. The Church legitimized the conflict, and above all, it provided money. 
Ferdinand needed money above all else. Cannons and provisions for his many footsoldiers were 
not free. Papal subsidization for the crusade against Granada allowed Ferdinand to modernize his 
military and successfully wage a war of conquest. This paper will examine both the ways in 
which the Castilian military changed during the crusade, and the role that the Catholic Church 
played in making those changes possible. 
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Introduction 
Ferdinand and Isabella were exceptional rulers who managed to consolidate a great deal 
of power during their reigns, however scholars agree that their rule did not by any means create a 
Spanish state.
1
 Theirs was certainly a union of crowns, a political marriage between two distinct 
kingdoms. However it would be very difficult to confidently choose a single point to mark the 
beginning of a Spanish state. Criteria for statehood are debatable, and transitions are gradual. 
What is clear is that the conquest of Granada had profound implications for the organization of 
Spanish military forces, and allowed Ferdinand and Isabella to concentrate a great deal of power 
in their courts. Religious sentiment and the aid of the Church made the conquest of Granada 
possible, for it was waged as a crusade, a culmination of the centuries-old Reconquista. The 
religious capital gained by waging the crusade against Granada enabled Ferdinand and Isabella 
to finance a modern army of conquest, which consolidated royal authority and signaled the 
decline of Spanish feudal society as well as the emergence of a powerful monarchy of 
transcontinental prominence. 
The surrender of the city of Granada to Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile on 2 
January 1492, marked the end of over seven centuries of Muslim political rule in southern Iberia 
and the culmination of a Reconquista movement that was almost equal in duration. Ever since 
the Umayyad Muslims overthrew the Spanish Visigothic monarchy of  Toledo in 711, Spanish 
Christian kings had desired to regain the territory lost to the Muslims. The imperative to drive 
the Muslims from the lost lands was seen as God's will, and sentiments of religious and territorial 
                                                 
1
 Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, "Cities and the State in Spain," in Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 1000 
to 1800, ed. Charles Tilly and Wim P. Blockmans (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 168. 
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conquest were intertwined by the middle of the eleventh century.
2
 The crusades of 1482-92 were 
a conscious continuation of the previous crusading tradition in Iberia, however as the 
culmination of the Reconquista, the war against Granada had military and political implications 
for the Spanish kingdoms that past conflicts did not. The conquest of Granada was made possible 
by the subsidization of the crusade by the Catholic Church which allowed Spanish forces to 
adopt the newest military technology known to Europeans at the time. The crusade provided 
Ferdinand and Isabella the funds they needed to build a modern standing army, a common enemy 
to unify their subjects against, and eventually, the lands of Granada itself. After the conquest of 
Granada, Spain emerged on the international sphere by funding exploration of North America as 
well as challenging France militarily in the Italian Wars of the early sixteenth century.
3
 None of 
these developments could have occurred without the benefit of church financing for the crusade 
against Granada. 
The final crusade against Granada was the first military campaign in Spain to reflect the 
modernization of tactics and weaponry that occurred in Europe during the fourteenth through 
eighteenth centuries. The defining development of the military revolution was the effective 
deployment of gunpowder artillery in an offensive role.
 4
 The acquisition and employment of 
siege artillery allowed Ferdinand and Isabella to "conquer the heretofore formidable fortresses 
constructed during the early and mid medieval period."
5
 According to military historian Weston 
F. Cook Jr., "gunpowder firepower and artillery siege operations won the Granadan war, and 
                                                 
2
 John Edwards, "Reconquista and Crusade in Fifteenth-Century Spain," in Crusading in the Fifteenth Century, ed. 
Norman Housley (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 165. 
3
 Albert D. McJoynt, introduction to The Art of War in Spain: The Conquest of Granada, 1481-1492, by William H. 
Prescott (London: Greenhill Books, 1995), 15-16. 
4
 Clifford J. Rogers, "The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years' War," Journal of Military History March 
(1993), 244. 
5
 McJoynt, introduction, 27. 
Clark 6 
 
other factors in the Spanish victory were actually secondary and derivative."
6
 Scholars agree that 
only the wealthiest governments could afford to acquire the gunpowder siege equipment 
necessary to wage an offensive siege campaign. While "acquisition costs and logistical support 
for a viable siege artillery train were beyond the means of the feudal lord, or even of a small 
country" like Castile or Aragon alone, papal aid for the crusade subsidized Spanish acquisition of 
a large artillery force that rivaled that of France or the Ottoman Empire.
7
 
Papal funds also enabled Ferdinand and Isabella to raise large numbers of new troops - a 
standing force similar to that of Charles VII of France in the last phase of the Hundred Years' 
War.
8
 The composition of Ferdinand's military during the crusade against Granada reflected a 
shift in European warfare away from the previous reliance on the shock capabilities of heavy 
cavalry towards a wider employment of cheaply raised projectile infantry in support of well-
trained pike infantry.
9
 This "increase in the size of the infantry, and the considerable numerical 
growth of the armies, entailed a large-scale plebification of warfare: once conceived of as a 
'noble' activity, proper to noblemen, it now became the almost exclusive preserve of the 
commons."
10
 These developments not only allowed Ferdinand to conquer Granada, but provided 
him with a modern military force that was capable of defending and expanding his imperial 
claims. 
Of course it cost money to forge cannons and pay men-at-arms. Primary documents show 
that Pope Sixtus IV was "conscious that the resources of the king and queen are insufficient for 
operations against the kingdom of Granada and for such a great exaltation of the faith..." and 
                                                 
6
 Weston F. Cook, "The Cannon Conquest of Nasrid Spain and the End of the Reconquista," Journal of Military 
History January (1993). 
7
 McJoynt, introduction, 27. 
8
 McJoynt, introduction, 38. 
9
 Rogers, "Military Revolutions," 248-49. 
10
Luis Ribot García, "Types of Armies: Early Modern Spain," in War and Competition Between States, ed. Philippe 
Contamine (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000),  47. 
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gave accordingly, granting indulgences for both fighters and those who paid a set donation to the 
war effort.
11,12 
He also diverted two-thirds of one tenth of the church's revenue in Spain to the 
campaign against Granada, while the remaining third of the tax went to pay for crusades against 
the Ottoman Turks.
13
 Subsequent bulls continued the indulgences and increased subsidies to the 
Catholic monarchs by at least 100,000 Aragonese gold florins.
14
 Spanish historian M.A. Ladero 
Quesada estimates papal aid to the monarchs at the "enormous sum of approximately 800 million 
maravedíes, three-quarters of which are accounted for in surviving documents. On this basis 
Ladero has no hesitation in affirming that 'With the money from the crusade [bull] and the tenth, 
the Crown financed the greater part of the war.'"
15
 Clearly the involvement of the Church in the 
conquest of Granada was integral to its success. 
Fortunately military histories of the conquest of Granada are plentiful. Modern military 
historians draw inferences from the primary documents and contemporaneous accounts that 
scholars have been aware of for centuries. William H. Prescott's The History of the Reign of 
Ferdinand and Isabella, The Catholic, first published in December 1837, deals mainly "with 
politics, war and diplomacy rather than with social or economic institutions," and remains canon 
with military historians due to its thorough yet skeptical use of primary sources.
16,17 
Modern 
                                                 
11
 Pope Sixtus IV, "Pope Sixtus IV grants the cruzada to Ferdinand and Isabella for the war against Granada, 10 
August 1482," in Documents on the Later Crusades, 1274-1580, ed. Norman Housley (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1996), 157. 
12
 See also José Goñi Gaztambide, "The Holy See and Reconquest of Granada," in Spain in the Fifteenth Century, 
ed. Roger Highfield (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1972), 357. The papal bull of 1482 granted indulgences for 
financial contributors to the crusade as well as military participants, a first for Spanish crusades. 
13
 Pope Sixtus IV, "Pope Sixtus IV grants the cruzada to Ferdinand and Isabella for the war against Granada, 10 
August 1482," 162. 
14
 Hernando del Pulgar, "Crónica de los reyes catolicos chapter 176," in Documents on the Later Crusades, 1274-
1580, ed. Norman Housley (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 164. 
15
 Edwards, "Reconquista and Crusade in Fifteenth-Century Spain," 175. 
16
 William H. Prescott, The Art of War in Spain: The Conquest of Granada, 1481-1492. ed. Albert D. McJoynt 
(London: Greenhill Books, 1995), 253. Note that The Art of War in Spain is based on seven chapters of Prescott's 
Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella with editorial revisions and extensive updated material focused on the military 
aspects of the campaign, all contributed by editor Albert D. McJoynt. 
17
 Ibid., 255. 
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historians like Albert D. McJoynt, and Weston F. Cook Jr., are able to dissect Prescott's work 
and the sources it contains to examine specific components of the military struggle. For example, 
Cook examines in detail the role of artillery in the conquest of Granada. Military histories 
discuss the changes that occurred in the Castilian military during and after the crusade against 
Granada, and they contextualize these changes within the broader European military revolution. 
The most significant primary source for any study of the final crusade against Granada or 
the lives of Ferdinand and Isabella is Hernando del Pulgar. Del Pulgar was the royal 
historiographer in Queen Isabella's court, and wrote about the conquest as a historian and as a 
witness, accompanying the monarchs to sieges in 1485, 1487, and 1489.
18
 While his writing is 
admittedly celebratory of both his personal accomplishments as well as those of the monarchs he 
served, del Pulgar remains the most informed primary source on the subject. His combination of 
firsthand experience, access to the monarchs, and access to royal records and libraries positions 
him above all others to give a comprehensive account of the campaign, from the view of the 
Spaniards in any case. His Crónica de los muy altos y esclarecidos reyes cathólicos don 
Fernando y doña Ysabel de gloriosa memoria covers the reign of the Catholic monarchs until 
1490, when it is likely that del Pulgar died. 
Histories of the crusade against Granada between 1482 and 1492 tend to be either 
military studies or narrative accounts of the conquest. Historians acknowledge the support of the 
Church for the crusade against Granada. However papal subsidization of the Reconquista was so 
well-established by the time of Ferdinand and Isabella that many writers merely summarize the 
benefits granted to the monarchs by the Church. The role of the Church's support in effecting the 
changes in Ferdinand's military has been overlooked. This paper hopes to address the role that 
                                                 
18
 Joseph Abraham Levi, "Hernando del Pulgar (Fernando del Pulgar)," in Dictionary of Literary Biography v.286: 
Castilian Writers, 1400-1500, ed. Frank A. Domínguez and George D. Greenia (Farmington Hills: The Gale Group 
Inc.), 190. 
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religion and Church finances played in the military evolution that occurred in Spain at the end of 
the fifteenth century. 
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Chapter 1 
The union between the crowns of Aragón and Castile was built on military dominance. 
The reign of the Catholic monarchs signaled a shift in the composition of the Spanish military, 
and Ferdinand and Isabella did not forget the value of a strong army for keeping rebellious 
nobles or dynastic rivals in check. Dynastic intrigue immediately forced the monarchs to defend 
their claim to the Castilian throne from Isabella's relative Joanna and her husband Afonso V, the 
king of Portugal.
19
 Ferdinand assumed personal control of the military effort, and by 1479 he had 
"virtually won the crown for his wife."
20
  As militaries across the European continent 
modernized, the army became "one of the fundamental pillars in the new political fabric, along 
with bureaucracy, diplomacy, new fiscal procedures, and a whole series of developments. At the 
root of this transformation lay the assumption, on the part of the king, of a monopoly in the 
affairs of war."
21
 While political necessity occasioned Ferdinand's early command, his continued 
personal leadership during the crusade against Granada made him the most prominent military 
figurehead in Spain.
22
 The authority that Ferdinand gained during the crusade, combined with the 
capital that Isabella was able to solicit from the Vatican in support of the war, allowed the 
monarchs to modernize their army to engage in wars of conquest. After Granada fell in 1492, 
Ferdinand, for instance, was able to use his military to defend his international territorial claims 
and even expand his empire into North Africa and North America. 
  
  
                                                 
19
 John Edwards, Ferdinand and Isabella, (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2005), 13. 
20
 Paul Stewart, "Military command and the development of the viceroyalty under Ferdinand and Isabella," The 
Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 5 (1975): 226. 
21
 Luis Ribot García, "Types of Armies: Early Modern Spain," in War and Competition Between States, ed. Philippe 
Contamine (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000),  37. 
22
 Stewart, "Viceroyalty under Ferdinand and Isabella," 226. 
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Talas and Treaties 
When considered in its entirety, the Reconquista often seems like a divinely ordained 
exodus of the Muslim invaders from the Iberian peninsula. Certainly the papacy and the leaders 
of the many crusades viewed their efforts as such. The fragmented remains of the Visigothic 
kingdom must have been stunned by the ruthless military efficiency that the Umayyad Muslims 
displayed in their seven year conquest of Iberia, and focused their immediate efforts on self-
preservation.
23
 The efforts to recapture the lost territory rapidly took on the religious tenor that 
gives the Reconquista an exaggerated sense of mandate and unity. By the time Castilian and 
Leonese forces recaptured the symbolically important former Visigothic capital of Toledo in 
1085, there existed a prevailing attitude among Asturian kings and their chroniclers that any 
conquest of Muslim territory was "for the recovery and extension of the Church of Christ, for the 
destruction of the pagans, the enemies of Christ, and the building up and benefit of the 
Christians..."
24
 Similar rhetoric was found in papal bulls granting indulgences to knights fighting 
in Spain even before the capture of Toledo, and only increased after the First Crusade established 
what would become the centuries-long pattern of European crusading.
25
 Despite the papal 
endorsement given to the Reconquista movement, however, instances of Christian kings fighting 
each other were as numerous as instances of Christian kings uniting against Muslim foes. And 
although the Iberian kings conquered for the glory of God, "what was lost in seven years, 
[nevertheless] took seven hundred to regain."
26
 
                                                 
23
 Elena Lourie, "A Society Organised for War: Medieval Spain," in Crusade and Colonisation, Elena Lourie 
(Aldershot: Variorum, 1990), 54. 
24
 Sancho I Ramírez of Aragon and Navarre, referring to his capture and settlement of Montemayor. See John 
Edwards, "Reconquista and Crusade in Fifteenth-Century Spain," in Crusading in the Fifteenth Century, ed. Norman 
Housley (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 165. 
25
 Edwards, "Reconquista and Crusade," 166. 
26
 J.H. Elliott, Imperial Spain 1469-1716 (London, 1963), 14, cited in Lourie, Crusade and Colonisation, 54. 
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 Christian expansion in the wake of Muslim conquest was intermittent. The small 
Christian kingdoms that remained in the north of Spain at first lacked the resources to seriously 
challenge the overwhelmingly superior Umayyad caliphate.
27
 It was generally discord within the 
Muslim kingdoms that provided the opportunity for Christian expansion. The dissolution of the 
Cordoban Caliphate in the early eleventh century allowed Castilians to recapture Toledo and 
settle in the Tagus valley, however these successes prompted the invasion of the Almoravid and 
Almohad caliphates in close succession, which halted Christian advances for another century.
28
 
Significant advances were not made again until the middle of the thirteenth century, when the 
complementary but independent efforts of Ferdinand III of Castile and James I of Aragón 
resulted in the capture of Córdoba and Seville and the region of Valencia respectively.
29
 By the 
middle of the fourteenth century, the kingdom of Granada was the only remaining Muslim state 
on the Iberian peninsula and the general demographic patterns that defined the remaining 
centuries of al-Andalus had been set. The Christian kingdoms had expanded from their refuge in 
the Cantabrian mountains to encompass almost "two-thirds of Spain, together with a still higher 
proportion of its population."
30
 The middle of the fourteenth century marked the beginning of a 
lull in crusading activity in Iberia that would last until 1481. The grand strategy of the Christian 
kings became one "aimed at containment rather than elimination of a player - 'more parade than 
crusade.'"
31
  
                                                 
27
 Lourie, Crusade and Colonisation, 54. 
28
 Edwards, "Reconquista and Crusade," 164. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Weston F. Cook, "The Cannon Conquest of Nasrid Spain and the End of the Reconquista," Journal of Military 
History January (1993), 47-48. John Edwards is quick to note that despite the general perception of the century 
between the reign of Peter of Castile and Ferdinand and Isabella as fallow for crusading, this is not entirely the case. 
Certainly papal support for crusades in Iberia continued throughout the period, despite the Great Schism of the 
Western Church that produced multiple popes and cast papal authority into a state of confusion. For example, 
Ferdinand "de Antequerra" won his nickname after a five month siege of Antequerra that featured artillery and other 
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 With most of the peninsula securely in Christian hands, the Iberian kings were free to vie 
for peninsular hegemony, and "largely ignored the emirate of Granada, except as a possible ally, 
instead devoting themselves to internecine conflict, within and between the Christian 
kingdoms."
32
 While Christian kings preferred to wage dynastic wars rather than conquer 
Granada, nobles on both sides of the border kept the conflict alive through localized skirmishes. 
"Offensives became seasonal cavalry raids over porous frontier borders, the low-level enterprise 
of raid, ravage, and plunder known in Castilian and Arabic as tala."
33
 This style of warfare was 
common in Europe before the military revolution. Feudal warfare was dominated by wealthy 
lords who had sufficient land and capital to outfit themselves as cavalry. Horses provided their 
rider with the requisite mobility to strike at undefended towns or burn crops in the hinterland of a 
city and escape any unwanted conflicts with a superior force. Campaigns were mounted during 
the Spring and Summer, and combatants returned home each year for the colder months. 
Chivalric warfare sometimes "seemed more like sport than serious business."
34
 The scale and 
mortality of tala warfare remained comparatively low because one motivation behind any 
cavalry engagement was the prospect of ransoms. Royalty and nobility could bring in exorbitant 
ransom fees if captured, but any mounted soldier likely had access to enough capital to make 
capturing them far more desirable than killing them.
35
 Cavalry raids were yearly occurrences on 
the Iberian peninsula during the decades leading up to the war for Granada, and these minor 
skirmishes did little to affect the general balance of peace between the Muslim and Christian 
royal courts. However, in 1481 all of that would change as the Muslim capture of Zahara and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
siege engines. Despite this success however the crusade ended in a treaty with the Emir of Granada rather than the 
destruction of the Muslim realm. See Edwards, "Reconquista and Crusade," 167-68. 
32
 Edwards, "Reconquista and Crusade," 167. 
33
 Cook, "The Cannon Conquest of Nasrid Spain," 48. 
34
 Clifford J. Rogers, "The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years' War," Journal of Military History March 
(1993),  255. 
35
 Ibid., 256. 
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subsequent retaliation of the impetuous Marquis of Cádiz gave Ferdinand and Isabella the pretext 
they needed to launch an offensive crusade unrivaled by any on the peninsula in the preceding 
half-century. 
The war for Granada showcased Spanish gunnery and placed the army under royal 
command, yet ironically the events that sparked the conflict were determined by the 
headstrongness of two lords and the feats of two teams of escaladeros, or wall-climbers. On the 
evening of December 26, 1481, a force of 300 cavalry and 4,000 infantry under the command of 
Ibrahim al-Hakim approached the fortified Christian town of Zahara, and after "scaling the walls 
under favour of a furious tempest, which prevented [their] approach from being readily 
heard...swept away the whole population of the place, men, women, and children, in slavery to 
Granada."
36
 Two months later, the Marquis of Cádiz captured the fortress of Alhama in much the 
same manner as Zahara fell. It was his decision to occupy Alhama rather than retreat in the face 
of reinforcements from Granada that compelled Ferdinand to undertake a campaign of conquest 
beginning in 1482.
37
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
William H. Prescott, The Art of War in Spain: The Conquest of Granada, 1481-1492, ed. Albert D. McJoynt 
(London: Greenhill Books, 1995), 140. 
37
 Ibid., 143. Prescott claims that the Marquis indignantly rejected the advice to withdraw from Alhama. Prescott 
implies that the Marquis was eager to go to war after Isabella had negotiated an end to his feud with another 
powerful Castilian family. The Marquis' soldiers on the other hand were enticed to stay by the amount of plunder 
they had gained from the settlement. 
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Thunder of God - Artillery in the crusade 
To wage a crusade of true conquest, Ferdinand needed innovation. Castilian forces had 
not permanently captured a Granadan settlement in over a quarter-century by the time Pope 
Sixtus granted the cruzada to Ferdinand and Isabella in the summer of 1482. Warfare was 
predictable; each year raiding parties sallied forth from fortified frontier towns, and each year 
they returned to the safety of their fortresses for the winter. With a proper garrison, fortified 
settlements could usually be held until starved out or relieved by reinforcements. Ferdinand 
lacked the time to outwait every stronghold in Granada if he was to conquer within his lifetime a 
kingdom that had eluded Christian kings for centuries. At the outset, the advantage seemed to 
belong to Granada. Their "strength lay in interlocking fortifications planted in rugged terrain, hit-
and-run guerilla cavalry tactics, and a people's militia infantry organized around a small corps of 
state-paid professionals fighting on interior lines."
38
 In other words, it was much easier to contain 
Granada than to engage them offensively. What Ferdinand needed were guns, as many as 
possible. 
A war of territorial conquest against Granada was a bold undertaking. Siege campaigns 
were expensive and laborious undertakings well into the fifteenth century. Fourteenth-century 
French writer Pierre Dubois described sieges as impractical: "A castle can hardly be taken within 
a year, and even if it does fall, it means more expenses for the king's purse and for his subjects 
than the conquest is worth. Because of these lengthy, dangerous and arduous sieges, and because 
battle and assaults can be avoided, leaders are apt to come to agreements which are unfavorable 
to the stronger party."
39
 Granada was able to survive for centuries by maneuvering the power 
relations between Iberian kingdoms so that no realm had the resources or sufficient incentive to 
                                                 
38
 Cook, "The Cannon Conquest of Nasrid Spain," 58. 
39
 Clifford J. Rogers, "The military revolutions of the Hundred Years' War," Journal of Military History April 
(1993), 273. 
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attempt a full-scale conquest of their southern neighbor.
40
 What allowed Ferdinand to overcome 
Granada's defensive advantages was the aggressive acquisition and deployment of offensive 
gunpowder weaponry.  
Prior to the last decades of the fourteenth century, gunpowder weapons were deployed 
most effectively in defensive roles. Gunpowder artillery simply lacked the firepower to seriously 
threaten well-engineered stone fortifications. "As late as c. 1420, a German author held that the 
defender of a well-equipped castle, provided with artillery and good gunners, 'whatever his 
enemy may attempt, will be able to hold off the enemy…until he is relieved or the enemy is 
given a good thrashing and departs the siege."
41
 By the middle of the century however, advances 
in the design and construction of siege artillery had rendered cannons capable of breaching stone 
walls.
42
 This achievement marked the point at which gunpowder weaponry "reversed the long-
standing superiority of the defensive in siege warfare."
43
 The first significant sustained use of 
gunpowder weapons in offensive sieges occurred during the latter half of the Hundred Years' 
War when Charles VII deployed artillery en masse to capture English strongholds. French 
artillery was present in Iberia during the early decades of the Hundred Years' War, however it 
played an inconclusive role.
44
 Despite the limited effectiveness of French artillery in the Iberian 
theater, Ferdinand was influenced by Charles' wider success: "Because artillery so shaped its 
operations and conduct, the War for Granada bore far greater resemblance to the Valois eviction 
                                                 
40
 Cook notes that Amir Saad's defense of his kingdom against Castile was tacitly aided by Aragon, Navarre, and 
Italy. Cook, "The Cannon Conquest of Nasrid Spain," 49. 
41
 Clifford J. Rogers, "Military revolutions," 261-62. 
42
 Ibid., 265-66. Between 1420 and 1440, artillery grew in length and began to be loaded with more potent 
gunpowder. These combined developments allowed artillery to shoot further and do much more damage, increasing 
their value as siege weapons. English artillery was capable of breaching town walls by 1437, and by the 1440s 
Franco-Burgundian artillery could assail any fortress the English possessed. Sieges were shortened from months to 
weeks or even days as artillery bombardment wrought sufficient devastation within besieged towns to force them to 
come to terms quickly. Towns were now vulnerable to direct assault as well, as defensive towers could be 
demolished and gaps could be made in walls for infantry to assault through. 
43
 Ibid., 244. 
44
 Cook, "The Cannon Conquest of Nasrid Spain," 48. 
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of England from France or the Ottoman conquest of Byzantium and the Balkans than to earlier 
Reconquista campaigns."
45
 To wage a war of conquest against Granada, Ferdinand and Isabella 
would need to make a considerable investment in gunpowder weaponry. Earlier Spanish 
monarchs either lacked the resources to acquire significant numbers of firearms or reigned before 
the technology had been proven in Europe. Even before the war for Granada began, Ferdinand 
and Isabella recognized the importance of artillery and took measures to improve their 
gunpowder weaponry. In just three years after securing power, the monarchs increased the 
number of artillerymen in the Castilian army from four to sixty-five.
46
 Respect for the offensive 
capabilities of artillery and the ability to acquire and deploy artillery pieces were entirely 
different however. 
Opening engagements in the war for Granada quickly proved the need for artillery. 
Zahara and Alhama had both been taken under cover of night and poor weather. The element of 
surprise and even a sleeping sentinel had allowed the capture of these settlements.
47
 Once the 
capture of Alhama warranted intervention by the crowns of Granada as well as Aragón and 
Castile, surprise became difficult to achieve. Both Ferdinand and the Marquis of Cádiz knew full 
well that Alhama would suffer a Muslim counterattack due to its close proximity to the city of 
Granada. The marquis repaired the town's fortifications as best he could, and the king marshaled 
reinforcements. It was no surprise then when Abu l-Hasan Ali, the King of Granada, arrived 
before the gates of Alhama on the 5th of March, 1482 with the notoriously numerous host of his 
city - 3,000 cavalry and 50,000 infantry.
48
 What the king had failed to bring in his haste however 
were any artillery pieces. Granadan forces used their numerical superiority to assault all quarters 
                                                 
45
 Ibid., 44. 
46
 Albert D. McJoynt, introduction to The Art of War in Spain: The Conquest of Granada, 1481-1492, by William H. 
Prescott (London: Greenhill Books, 1995), 54. 
47
 Prescott, The Art of War in Spain, 142. 
48
 Ibid., 146.  
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of the town, however the Castilian defenders held, and after sustaining heavy losses, the 
Granadan king decided instead to blockade the defenders, who had left their baggage train 
behind in their eagerness to assault the town by surprise.
49
 Without artillery, Abu l-Hasan had to 
content himself with the more traditional, and more importantly, more time-consuming 
besiegement method of starving out the defenders. Time was not on the king's side however as 
both Ferdinand and the Duke of Medina Sidonia were marching on his position with 
reinforcements for the besieged Spaniards. The Duke's army numbered five thousand cavalry and 
forty thousand infantry, and reflected his substantial wealth and power as the premier noble of 
southern Spain.
50
 The Duke was poised to arrive first after ignoring orders to halt his army and 
wait for Ferdinand to assume command, and so Abu l-Hasan was forced to retreat on the 29th of 
March to avoid being caught between the garrison of Alhama and the incoming troops.
51
 Thus 
from the outset the traditional methods of siege warfare proved inadequate to win or regain 
territory in the War for Granada. 
Ferdinand eagerly took to the field at the head of his troops in June 1482, but found that 
the repartimientos, or provisions, and levies of troops asked of the cities and districts of Castile 
and Aragón were largely unfulfilled.
52
 More importantly, Ferdinand had only a few pieces of 
artillery under his command. His target was the settlement of Loja, a naturally defensible 
stronghold reinforced by 3,000 troops following the loss of nearby Alhama.
53
As his forces 
deployed the artillery on a ridge overlooking the town, the Granadan garrison under Ali Atar 
sallied forth from Loja and drew the Spanish forces from the ridge. While the Spaniards were 
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preoccupied, Granadan jinetes carried off their artillery and harassed their troops until 
reinforcements could arrive. The debacle persuaded Ferdinand to retreat, and he undertook no 
further offensives that year. William H. Prescott notes that perhaps Ferdinand and Isabella 
underestimated the resolve of the Granadans, either due to eagerness for glory or the relative ease 
with which Alhama had fallen. It is impossible to know whether excessive zeal clouded 
Ferdinand's judgment, but perhaps inexperience with siege artillery led him to underestimate the 
importance of a well supplied and well defended artillery train in any army of conquest. 
The following year was met by further defeat for Castile and Aragón. Military 
intelligence suggested that the region of Málaga lacked cavalry protection and was vulnerable to 
attack through a chain of mountains called the Ajarquía. The Grand Master of Castilian forces 
communicated the intelligence to noblemen on the border, who gathered their personal retinues 
to undertake the expedition.
54
 The force that marched upon Málaga was undisciplined, and most 
of the front and center columns broke rank to plunder the countryside, with some of the most 
impetuous knights riding within sight of the city's walls unsupported.
55
 A Granadan ambush 
spurred a nightlong Castilian retreat and left between 200 and 800 Christians dead, with many 
more taken captive.
56
 Andres Bernáldez, the Curate of Los Palacios and one of the primary 
chroniclers of the War for Granada, attributed the loss to divine displeasure: "The number of the 
Moors was small, who inflicted this grievous defeat on the Christians. It was, indeed, clearly 
miraculous, and we may discern in it the special interposition of Providence, justly offended with 
the greater part of those that engaged in the expedition; who...with little regard to God's service, 
were influenced by covetousness and love of ungodly gain."
57
 The Curate, like many chroniclers 
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of the age, emphasizes the religious dimensions of the war, however he is likely right that the 
noblemen's forces were lured by the spoils of war. The Marquis of Cádiz was one of the 
noblemen that ventured into the Ajarquía, and his retinue was accustomed to gaining from their 
struggles. The Curate claims that the unwillingness of the Marquis' men to part with the spoils of 
Alhama influenced his decision to occupy the town, rather than dismantle the citadel and retreat 
as was suggested by some of his advisors.
58
 No sooner had the Duke of Medina Sidonia relieved 
the besieged garrison at Alhama than a quarrel broke out between members of the army 
concerning division of the spoils that the town had yielded. Only the tact of the Duke, who 
compelled his men to be contented with aiding a fellow countryman against the Muslim foe, 
prevented the quarrel from escalating.
59
 Whether or not the defeat in the Ajarquía was divine 
punishment, it seems clear that it was greed and lack of discipline that enticed the troops of all 
but the Grand Master of Santiago to break battle readiness and pillage the hinterland of Málaga. 
Had the troops shown better professionalism and ridden together in formation, the Castilian 
forces would have had much improved chances for at least an organized retreat.  
The failed campaigns of 1482 and 1483 held several lessons for Ferdinand and Isabella. 
First, they demonstrated the necessity of gunpowder artillery and sufficient ammunition in order 
to threaten a fortified position. Loja was an embarrassing reminder that enthusiasm alone was 
insufficient to defeat an enemy fighting to defend their home. Next, they suggested that royal 
consolidation of military authority was required to achieve territorial conquest. Nobles often 
acted independently and were motivated more by personal glory or profit potential than by 
religious ideals, fealty, or military discipline. In the Ajarquía, only the forces of the Master of 
Santiago marched in battle order. The Master of Santiago was an extremely prestigious member 
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of the Castilian court, and along with the leaders of the other Holy Military Orders provided 
some of the most disciplined and loyal troops that the Catholic monarchs had at their disposal.
60
 
The system of talas led by powerful border nobles would have to be replaced by a concerted 
artillery offensive consolidated under royal control if Ferdinand and Isabella desired to add the 
gem of Granada to their crowns. 
The Catholic monarchs were not ones to repeat a mistake. Artillery acquisition and 
training began in earnest after the debacle at Loja. Ferdinand encouraged the growth of a nascent 
arms industry in Aragón by constructing a cannonball and powderworks in the Constantine 
Mountains, with arsenals in Seville, Córdoba, and Ecija.
61
 In 1482, Ferdinand appointed 
Francisco Ramírez de Madrid as Master of Artillery. Seven years later, the Master of Artillery 
was made part of the Casa Real, and the personnel of the artillery department were made 
permanent, which placed the artillery firmly under the control of the king.
62
 By 1485, the 
Catholic monarchs had increased the numbers of lombaderos, or master gunners, in the Castilian 
army from four to ninety-one.
63
 
 Ferdinand and Isabella's new focus on artillery paid dividends quickly. Just months after 
the rout in the Ajarquía, a sortie led by Ferdinand was able to destroy a fortified enemy 
encampment at Illora and proceed to capture the settlement of Tajara in a mere four days due to 
direct artillery assaults in both engagements. The summer campaign of 1483 marked a shift to a 
"mode of siege warfare where artillery did not so much support the assault as become the 
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assault."
64
 The Curate of Los Palacios recounted in his memoirs that "great towns - which once 
could have held out a year against all foes but hunger - now fell in a month."
65
 Many towns like 
Tajara fell much quicker as Spanish guns tore down walls and made further defense untenable in 
a matter of days. The capture of Ronda in 1485 took fourteen days; Velez fell in eleven days two 
years later.
66
 Spanish guns did more than tear down enemy fortifications. Gunpowder weapons 
possessed a certain demoralizing quality. At first gunpowder weapons caused more fear from 
their noise than their lethality, but once artillery could breach stone walls the fear of 
bombardment took on a new dimension. According to the chronicler Alonso de Palencia, when 
the walls of Alora fell in 1484, "there arose the most extraordinary clamor, howls and laments 
from the women, the weeping of children, raising the panic of defenders already overwhelmed 
with other fears."
67
 Many towns simply chose to surrender as soon as Ferdinand's gunners began 
laying their sighting stakes rather than face bombardment.
68
 With proper planning and enough 
artillery and ammunition, Ferdinand's forces need never suffer another embarrassment like Loja. 
Yearly artillery forays against strategically important settlements allowed Ferdinand and 
Isabella to rapidly consolidate territory. They only needed capture the most influential stronghold 
in a region to secure the capitulation of the entire area in most cases. In 1487, Velez was chosen 
as a target due to its strategic significance on the route to Málaga. After a brief siege, the capture 
of Velez spurred the surrender of more than twenty outlying settlements between it and the city 
of Málaga.
69
 The pattern of settlements in the hinterland surrendering after the capitulation of an 
urban center was not new to Iberian crusades or even to wars of territorial conquest in general. 
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However artillery sieges were much more rapid than former sieges in Iberian crusades, and the 
surrender of swaths of land at a time following a successful siege allowed Ferdinand and Isabella 
to rapidly conquer the remaining Granadan territory. 
All the same, superiority in firepower does not fully account for the Spanish success in 
capturing Granadan settlements. While Granada did not possess as many modern artillery pieces 
as Spain, what pieces they possessed could still effectively serve in defensive roles. Besieging 
forces still had to move within range of Granadan guns and even their dreaded poisoned 
crossbow bolts. Spanish commanders needed to develop strategies to effectively deploy both 
artillery and smaller gunpowder weaponry as the core of their forces. As Spanish strategy 
became more nuanced, gunpowder weaponry came to play a critical role in every juncture of 
territorial conquest. Handgunners and mobile field pieces escorted slow, lengthy siege artillery 
trains and defended the larger pieces once they were deployed and immobile. Siege artillery 
knocked gaps in enemy walls or simply lobbed projectiles inside the city to wreak devastation 
and coerce the defenders to surrender. Medium field artillery kept defenders from repairing 
damage to the walls or manning defensive artillery. Hernando del Pulgar described the chaos that 
the Spanish guns caused among the defenders of Ronda in 1485: "in one place the cannon 
knocked down the wall and in another wrecked the houses and, if they tried to repair the damage 
made by the lombardas they could not, for the unending hail of fire from smaller weapons killed 
anybody on the walls."
70
 The system of mutually supporting fire between different classes of 
guns kept defenders from repairing breaches or sallying forth to meet the besieging force, and 
closely resembled the tactics used by the forces of Charles VII in France.
71
 The primacy of 
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Spanish gunpowder weaponry carried every siege until the final siege of Granada itself in 1491, 
when Ferdinand and Isabella chose to outwait the enemy rather than bombard the city due to 
diplomatic considerations.
72
 Despite the silence of Spanish guns in 1491, the War for Granada 
very much changed the composition of the Spanish military. By the time "the war ended, the 
Catholic Monarchs owned over 180 large and medium pieces, five state-run foundries (many on 
Granadan soil), and the largest standing army in the west."
73
 The effective use of artillery and 
other gunpowder weaponry gave Ferdinand the advantage he needed to conquer territory from 
Granada, and it would also characterize the successes of his forces in Italy and North Africa in 
the years to come.  
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The plebs and crusade - Infantry in Ferdinand's army 
The armies that heeded the call to arms in each Iberian crusade were composed of 
eclectic forces. Italian knights, English lords, and Muslim auxiliaries all fought against Muslim 
kingdoms of al-Andalus.
74
 Even Ferdinand's army was a mix of noble retinues, town levies, 
religious brotherhoods, and the Santa Hermandad. However Ferdinand's army was not only 
more technologically advanced than previous crusading armies in Iberia, it was far more 
massive. His forces peaked at more than 60,000 combatants during the 1485 campaigning 
season.
75
 An army of such magnitude required more advanced organization than previous 
crusades had witnessed, and the increased prominence of infantry in the army ultimately 
reinforced the authority of the monarchs at the expense of noble autonomy. 
Like the use of artillery in offensive siege campaigns, organization of armies around 
infantry also developed out of the Hundred Years' War. However it was not Charles VII, but his 
neighbors who needed to counter his many powerful knights, that developed modern infantry 
armies. The increased reliance on infantry in armies as well as their relatively nascent ability to 
decisively alter battles due to innovations in weaponry led to what some military scholars refer to 
as the infantry revolution. Clifford J. Rogers writes that 
The armies that dominated the battlefields of Europe from the mid-eleventh century through the early 
fourteenth were composed primarily of feudal warrior-aristocrats, who owed military service for lands held 
in fief. They served as heavily armored cavalry, shock combatants, relying on the muscle power of man and 
steed, applied directly to the point of a lance or the edge of a sword. They fought more often to capture than 
to kill. The armies which conquered Europe's first global empires, on the other hand, differed from this 
description on every single count. They were drawn from the common population (albeit often led by 
aristocrats); they served for pay; they fought primarily on foot, in close-order linear formations which 
relied more on missile fire than shock action; and they fought to kill.
76
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The War for Granada catalyzed this change in the armies of Castile and Aragón. Nobles and their 
retinues still comprised a significant portion of Ferdinand's forces, however they were 
increasingly marginalized by circumstance and by design. 
 Following the civil war that secured Ferdinand and Isabella's claim to the throne in 
which many nobles supported Isabella's rival, the monarchs sought to strip the nobles of their 
military independence. This goal is exemplified by the annual decrees that forbade private 
manufacture or ownership of cannons. While these decrees were meant to reduce the military 
and political threat posed by semiautonomous nobles, they proved moot as the monarchs 
routinely asked to borrow cannons from their vassals.
77
 However the marginalization of cavalry 
during the War for Granada did more to reduce noble military power and increase royal control 
over the army than any decree could have.  
The siege campaigns that dominated the Spanish strategy for conquest did not require 
cavalry involvement on the scale that previous talas did. Vital artillery pieces were maintained 
by dismounted soldiers. Royal recruitment emphasized infantry; they were inexpensive to equip 
and required minimal training as opposed to a man-at-arms that required armor, a mount, and the 
leisure to train regularly.
78
 A strictly feudal recruitment system, with its absolute emphasis on 
mounted nobles, was inadequate to field the requisite troops needed to conquer and hold tracts of 
land over a decade-long war. Clifford J. Rogers argues that "because of its broader recruitment 
pool and lower costs of equipment and training, a military system based on common infantry - 
and only such a system - could turn surplus agricultural population into large numbers of soldiers 
for export to the world at large. Thus, the Infantry Revolution was a necessary precondition for 
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the European conquests of the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries."
79
 During the War for 
Granada, the Catholic monarchs increased the size of their military from 20,000 men to 60,000 
fighting men; only infantry recruited from the lower classes could swell the size of their army so 
dramatically.
80
 
 Ferdinand and Isabella deliberately sought to increase their control of the military at the 
expense of noble autonomy. Even before the War for Granada, Isabella revived the institution of 
the Santa Hermandad as a means to reinforce her authority against hostile nobles in the wake of 
the civil war that secured her accession. The brotherhood was originally intended to offer urban 
areas a means to band together for mutual military protection, but Ferdinand and Isabella 
employed it as a sort of standing force throughout the duration of the war. The Hermandad was 
under Royal control from the instant it was reestablished. Ferdinand's brother was made its first 
captain-general in 1476.
81
 A royal decree in 1485 organized the infantry wing of the Hermandad 
under Royal command and designated a modest uniform; the role of the Santa Hermandad 
changed from one of local protection to dynastic expansion.
82
 Ferdinand and Isabella 
increasingly co-opted the institution for their own purposes. By 1488, towns no longer provided 
separate levies for the Santa Hermandad but instead pooled men who were placed into squadrons 
that were ultimately organized into twelve captaincies. The towns still salaried the common 
soldiers, but they were under the command of capitanes and cuadrilleros (squadron leaders) that 
were chosen and paid by the monarchs.
83
 The Hermandad was an important part of the Spanish 
infantry that took on an increasingly prominent role under Ferdinand, and it was under royal 
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authority. The institutionalization of the Hermandad further gentrified the Spanish military and 
reflected a deliberate effort to marginalize the power of the nobles in war.  
 The most significant tactical advantage that the reestablishment of the Santa Hermandad 
offered the Catholic monarchs was the ability to keep a military force in the field year-round. 
Feudal warfare consisted of annual campaigns during temperate weather with cessation of 
hostilities each winter. However a salaried body of infantry did not need to return to their 
seigniorial estates each year, and could operate throughout the year. An institution originally 
conceived for mutual defense and public order now served as Spain's first standing military 
force.
84
 The Hermandad was integrated with Ferdinand's artillery strategy, and cannons defended 
vulnerable winter camps from Granadan guerilla raids.
85
 Granadans were surprised and 
disappointed when Christian troops did not break the siege of their city during the winter of 1491 
but instead built the fortified encampment of Santa Fe. Algerian chronicler Abu'l Abbas al-
Maqqarī later wrote that " [The townsmen in 1491] thought and expected, with winter 
approaching, the Christians would raise the siege and retire to their country. Our hopes were 
dashed. They built a town in front of our city and pressed the siege closer than ever."
86
 
Despite efforts to recruit troops to serve under royal command, Ferdinand still relied on 
noble retinues, mercenaries, Muslim subjects, and foreign adventurers to bolster the size of his 
army.
87
 It is important to note that Royal consolidation of military authority was met with 
resistance by nobles who resented impingements on their social position and still wielded 
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considerable ability to make demands of the monarchs. Nobles were able to protect their vested 
interests and demand concessions from the monarchs by refusing to aid them unless their 
demands were met.
88
 Major offensives required the cooperation of the nobility, and so the 
monarchs were forced to "bargain with hidalgo or shaykh nobles, towns, and other institutions 
eager to brake the absolutist pretensions of kings and amirs [sic]."
89
 Ferdinand and Isabella were 
aware of their dependence on seigniorial troop quotas for their army, and pursued a policy of 
guarded non-antagonism toward their nobility following the War for Castilian succession. Rather 
than explicitly attacking the privileges of the nobility, the monarchs marginalized their role in 
war by adopting a strategy of conquest that did not favor the strengths of the nobility and by 
incorporating their forces under Royal control. Once Ferdinand established a command structure 
for his army, what he needed most were soldiers. In an effort to bring these disparate groups 
under Royal command, Ferdinand strove to organize them into standardized 800-man capitanías, 
an effort that was not always greeted with enthusiasm from the semiautonomous military groups 
that were incorporated into this scheme.
90
 However the tactic did have marked advantages in 
deployment mobility and combat efficacy compared to attempting to foster cooperation between 
separate command structures.  
As the war progressed as a series of artillery sieges, and not cavalry raids that yielded 
captives and prestige for mounted nobles, many nobles chose to meet their military duty by 
sending their required quota of troops under a son or deputy rather than commanding them 
personally. A few recognizable nobles like the Marquis of Cádiz were present in person at the 
final siege of Granada, but general war weariness among the nobility prompted many to merely 
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send their quota of troops when summoned.
91
 Machiavelli perceived that the monarchs used the 
crusade to "engage the energies of the barons of Castile who, as they were giving their minds to 
the war, had no mind for causing trouble at home. In this way, without their realising what was 
happening, he increased his standing and his control over them."
92
 Even noble retinues 
increasingly served under captains dependent on Ferdinand and Isabella for their positions, and 
so military leadership "passed from the nobles to the king through their acceptance of his 
leadership in the war, or that of his chosen captains-general."
93
 Successful military expansion 
required better military organization than traditional feudal relationships offered. 
 Once Ferdinand had numerous troops and an effective command structure, he needed to 
equip them. Spanish infantry quickly became associated with the use of handguns in combat 
because they were purchasable en masse. The introduction of the arquebus by the middle of the 
fifteenth century made handguns viable infantry weapons, because they could now be fired by 
just one man.
94
 The Spanish were early adopters of the espingarda, a particular version of the 
arquebus. Handguns in the late fifteenth century slightly underperformed crossbows in accuracy 
and reloading rate, however their "principle advantage was to equip a rapidly expanding infantry 
army."
95
 Ferdinand swelled his forces by requiring quotas of armed espingaderos from the 
towns. While handguns certainly could not compare to the premier individual missile weapon of 
the day, the longbow, they could be mass-produced and unskilled urban levies could rapidly 
achieve proficiency in their use. Longbows on the other hand required master craftsmanship and 
a lifetime of training to gain proficiency. Longbowmen were supplanted by gunpowder infantry 
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on European battlefields because simply not enough could be fielded to fight continual wars of 
expansion.
96
 In the face of tens of thousands of infantrymen, longbows did not become obsolete, 
they became irrelevant. 
 Just like innovations in gunpowder artillery changed the nature of siege warfare, the 
preponderance of infantry in early modern armies revolutionized field engagements. Use of the 
longbow, crossbow, handguns and pikes gave infantry the ability to defeat cavalry and win 
battles of their own accord. However the wide spread employment of these weapons by infantry 
forces of unprecedented size made battles far more lethal. Personal surrenders and ransoms 
became few as ranged weapons and long pikes prevented communication between aggressors on 
the battlefield; even if combatants did meet, common infantry were unlikely to command a high 
enough ransom to warrant their capture, and class tension often carried violence between infantry 
and cavalry to extreme proportions.
97
 Spanish hidalgos greatly feared the lethality of poisoned 
Muslim crossbow bolts. The notion that a common infantryman could kill a mounted, armored 
noble with a lethal missile was very unsettling to the Spanish elite. Battlefields became even 
more perilous as infantry units fighting in formation were unable to accept personal surrenders 
without compromising their efficacy.
98
 Infantry were only effective as part of a cohesive unit, so 
engagements devolved into kill or be killed until one army was annihilated or surrendered en 
masse under the authority of a commander. Gone were the days of chivalry in warfare; 
Ferdinand's army was massive and it was lethal. 
The dramatic increase in infantry during the War for Granada left Ferdinand with an 
experienced body of infantry, many of whom subsequently served in the Italian Wars.
99
 Many of 
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the 5,000 infantry and 600 light cavalry that Ferdinand sent to Italy in the Summer of 1495 were 
veterans of the crusade against Granada.
100
 Military historian Luis Ribot García posits the high 
percentage of infantry veterans in the Spanish expeditionary force as one possible reason for 
their triumph over the French in Italy. The French army was composed of two-thirds cavalry, 
while veteran infantry made up fully three-quarters of the Spanish force.
101
 The Spanish infantry 
fought in combined pike and arquebus formations that negated the efficacy of French cavalry 
charges. The infantry that the Spanish expedition did encounter were primarily Swiss pikemen in 
the service of France, and their experience in close combat during city sieges gave them an 
advantage in defeating this formation. Spanish sword-and-buckler men displayed a marked 
proficiency in close quarters due to their experience as escaladores during the War for Granada, 
which required them to fight atop narrow city walls.
102
 Spanish expertise with gunpowder 
weaponry also gave them an advantage in Italy. A climactic Spanish victory over Swiss pikemen 
under French employ in 1503 was due to the effective use of hand-guns and small cannon by the 
Spanish.
103
 These weapons were acquired in increasing quantities during the crusade against 
Granada, and the campaign allowed Spanish commanders like Francisco Ramírez de Madrid the 
opportunity to develop the knowledge required to effectively deploy gunpowder forces - an asset 
arguably more advantageous than sheer firepower alone.
104
 The Spanish army emerged from the 
War for Granada as not only the largest army in the West, but as the "army with a future...not 
because it possessed one of the famous infantry techniques of the era [English longbowmen or 
Swiss pikemen], but because it had the fundamental preparation to be an aggressive and flexible 
force. More than any other European infantry of the period, it was embracing the individual 
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missile weapon system of the future (albeit probably more for economic than tactical 
reasons)."
105
 While Ferdinand's conquests in North Africa were construed as religious conquest 
in order to continue Church subsidization of his court, his intervention in Italy was decidedly 
secular. Ferdinand gained his premier military through service to God, however after the fall of 
Granada, his troops followed his mandate, not God's. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
105
 Ibid., 26. 
Clark 34 
 
Chapter 2 
"A man does not have himself killed for a half-pence a day or for a petty distinction. You must 
speak to the soul in order to electrify him." 
- Napoleon Bonaparte 
 
 
 In fifteenth-century Spain, only a crusade could have mobilized tens of thousands of men 
into the field. Ferdinand and Isabella, like a great many of their subjects, were devout Catholics. 
The monarchs felt compelled by God Himself to retake the kingdom of Granada for 
Christendom, surely the zeal of the royalty and their subjects was one of their greatest assets 
during the war. The authority of God united diverse elements of Spanish society under a 
common purpose. Granada had been able to survive the challenges of its Christian neighbors for 
centuries, however Ferdinand finally had the manpower (and firepower) to match the ambition of 
Christendom. The walls of Granada could stem the tide no longer. 
Ferdinand and Isabella very much understood their great need for money, soldiers and 
guns, but they publicly professed that they sought these things only to fulfill their duty to God: 
"We have not been moved nor are we moved to this war by any desire to enlarge our realms and 
seigniories, nor by greed to obtain greater revenues than those we possess, nor by any wish to pile up 
treasures; for should we wish to increase our sovereignty and enrich our revenues, we could do this with 
much less danger and travail and expenditure than we are putting forth in this. But our desire to serve God, 
and our zeal for His holy Catholic faith, make us put all other interests aside and forget the constant travails 
and dangers which continue to increase for this cause..."
106
 
 
If the monarchs had motivations other than religious, they did not explicitly state them. One is 
left to wonder which neighboring kingdoms presented less dangerous or expensive targets to the 
monarchs however. The kingdom of Granada enjoyed a defensive advantage - its rough terrain 
made it difficult to conquer - Ferdinand and Isabella received international support for their 
crusade of conquest. Such an outpouring of support would not have occurred had the monarchs 
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contented themselves with skirmishing against their traditional rivals the French and Portuguese 
or immediately pursued dynastic claims around the Mediterranean.
107
 Ferdinand gained 
thousands of troops from all corners of Europe, including France, since the mission to recapture 
Granada transcended political boundaries.
108
  
The monarchs strictly maintained their pious and zealous appearances throughout the 
war, from the solemn procession at the monastery of Santo Domingo el Real in 1482 that marked 
the beginning of the crusade until the final surrender of Granada in 1492.
109
 Writing in 1601, just 
over a century after the fall of the city, chronicler Juan de Mariana presents the lasting popular 
image of the Catholic monarchs as devout: "The king, kneeling with great humility, gave thanks 
to God for the empire of those wicked people having been uprooted in Spain, and for the banner 
of the cross having been raised in that city, where for so long impiety had prevailed with such 
force and with such deep roots. He prayed to God that His mercy should allow this victory to 
endure forever..."
110
 The maintenance of a pious appearance served the monarchs very well. By 
leading through example, Ferdinand and Isabella gained increased credibility as the leaders of a 
military crusade and increased leverage to demand favorable economic concessions from Rome. 
Holiness assured a place in heaven, however it had practical uses on Earth as well. 
Leading a crusade was an absolutely effective way for Ferdinand to assume total control 
of his military. Ferdinand and Isabella were imbued with symbolic significance as the final 
monarchs to wage the Reconquista. God commanded that the Muslims be driven from Iberia; his 
authority was represented on Earth by the Pope, who granted it in kind to Ferdinand and Isabella 
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through the bulas de la cruzada. The Reconquista was the defining element in the histories of the 
Christian kingdoms in Iberia, and notions of religious conquest, secular territorial conquest, 
divine mandate and royal representation became intricately intertwined over centuries of conflict. 
Perpetual conflict with Muslims shaped the identity of the early Asturian kingdoms so 
profoundly that residents referred to themselves simply as Christians; the term español, or 
Spaniard, only gradually caught on after the thirteenth century as other European Christians 
sought a label for their Iberian brethren.
111
 Over the course of centuries of intermittent conflict 
between Muslims and Christians in Iberia, a certain sense of community formed between the 
Christian kingdoms despite their somewhat frequent dynastic disputes and armed conflict. "A 
distinction developed between frontiers between Christian kingdoms in Iberia on the one hand, 
and frontiers between Christendom and Islam on the other. Papal influence led to the definition 
of frontiers to be pushed as far as possible."
112
 In this context, Muslims took on the dual 
identities of the invader and the opponent of Christianity, and the kings and queens who sought 
to drive them back across the straits of Gibraltar balanced the overlapping roles of statecraft and 
service to God.
113
 Ferdinand and Isabella commanded deep loyalty as religious figureheads, and 
their passion won them kingdoms and permanent acclaim. 
The conquest of Granada was unsurprisingly "preached and waged as a crusade, [and] the 
war's victories were construed as proof of divine approval of royal policy."
114
 Success in 
crusading gave Ferdinand and Isabella authority beyond the level they could command based on 
the size of their realms. The popular conception of the monarchs as pious representatives of God 
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was enthusiastically disseminated by their chroniclers. Upon the surrender of Granada in 1492, 
the Milanese humanist Pedro Mártir Anglería remarked that "this is the end of the calamities of 
Spain, this is the end of the happy fates of that barbaric people which, they say, some eight 
hundred years ago, at the command of Count Julian, came from Mauretania...At last, my Kings, 
accepted by God, are demolishing to the ground that cruel tyranny, broken by whole years of 
disasters."
115
 Surely the magnitude of the conquest of Granada both depended on and indicated 
divine approval. The nobles that had challenged the succession of Ferdinand and Isabella 
willingly acquiesced to royal demands for troops in support of the crusade against Granada. It 
was one thing to unsuccessfully challenge the royalty; to defy God was far more dangerous and 
foolish. 
The crusade against Granada gave Ferdinand and Isabella the authority to put an 
unprecedented number of troops in the field, but they needed money to do so. War had depleted 
the royal coffers since the beginning of their reign, when they were forced to fight a costly war to 
defend their thrones against a rival dynastic claim supported by the Portuguese.
116
 The monarchs 
had only a few years between 1479 and 1482 to rectify the state of their treasury before war once 
again dominated the royal expenses. The crusade against Granada was the first modern campaign 
of conquest in Spain, and it required expenditure on a scale beyond that of previous Reconquista 
campaigns.  According to military historian I.A.A. Thompson, "one of the principal 
consequences of the Military Revolution was a great increase in the cost of war, leading to the 
growth of state taxation, bureaucratic administration, and centralized government."
 117
 
Ferdinand's army was larger than previous crusading armies in Iberia, it was equipped with far 
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more gunpowder weaponry than previous armies, and it sometimes campaigned year-round, 
which all increased the costs of campaigning. Artillery was especially expensive; it required high 
capital investment to acquire artillery pieces, and the effective integration of artillery into the 
military required rigorous training, more officers, and a complex system of administration and 
logistical support.
118
 The increased assumption of the costs of war by the central government was 
typical of the Military Revolution. In neighboring France for example, by the middle of the 
fifteenth century, "the French government was spending more than twice as much on its artillery 
train as it spent on more traditional war materiel - arrows, lances, bows, etc."
119
 International 
conquest required the well stocked coffers or ample lines of credit that only a large kingdom 
could hope to possess. According to Clifford J. Rogers, "the great cost of artillery, and the larger 
armies engendered by the growing importance of open battle, put a premium on the ability to 
produce and manage large amounts of cash."
120
 The increasing power of artillery further 
marginalized the military power of feudal nobles and small kingdoms. "The central governments 
of large states could afford to acquire and maintain large siege trains: their subjects and smaller 
neighbors, in general, could not."
121
 Power was consolidated in the hands of those who could 
afford to wield a powerful and modern military. The major artillery trains of the early modern 
period belonged to France, Spain, and the Ottoman Empire, not to smaller or semiautonomous 
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units.
122
 The acquisition and deployment of significant numbers of artillery was risky and 
expensive, but ultimately necessary to capture the extensively fortified Kingdom of Granada.
123
 
One method the monarchs used extensively to raise money for the war effort was 
taxation. Taxes were unpopular, but effective. Tax revenues increased by thirty times under 
Ferdinand and Isabella, from 900,000 reales in 1474 to over 26 million reales in 1504.
 124
 
Commerce was consistently taxed, in the form of import and export duties as well as the 
alcabala, a tax of one-tenth the proceeds on all commercial transactions.
125
 Another method of 
domestic revenue was the sale of annuities, or juros. These loans provided easy revenue in the 
short term at the cost of future interest payments, however the sale of juros further consolidated 
royal control over the nobility as the wealthy families that bought the juros often came to depend 
on the interest payments they received from the king and queen.
126
 Taxes and debt both raised 
considerable amounts of revenue for the monarchs, but these sources of income were either 
insufficient to fight the war against Granada or were not the only sources of income easily 
available to Ferdinand and Isabella. Papal subsidization of crusades in Iberia dated back 
centuries prior to the final conquest of Granada, and the monarchs turned to Rome for aid almost 
immediately. 
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Papal support for the Reconquista was considerable. Even before Urban II preached the 
First Crusade in 1095, Popes granted indulgences to knights fighting in Spain.
127
 The most 
relevant innovation in papal support occurred when Pope Calixtus III issued a bull in 1456 that 
granted "the crusading indulgence, in return for cash, to those already dead, as well as to the 
living who participated in or else supported a crusade."
128
 The spiritual implications of the bull 
were controversial; opinion was divided regarding the authority of the Church over souls after 
they departed the flesh. However the material implications of the bull were made immediately 
clear - the sale of indulgences succeeded in raising 100 million maravedíes for Henry IV, 
Isabella's half-brother who ruled Castile at the time.
129
 Ferdinand and Isabella were fully aware 
of the financial advantages to be gained through papal support of a crusade. 
The Catholic Church possessed a sufficient income to subsidize a war, supported the 
Reconquista for religious reasons. Pope Sixtus IV wrote in the bula de cruzada of 1482 that the 
Catholic church sought timely ways of bringing about the "salvation of the souls of barbarian 
peoples, and for the humbling of any infidels, and their conversion to the faith."
130
 Ferdinand and 
Isabella always portrayed their motivations as strictly religious. In 1485 they wrote that they 
hoped "only that the holy Catholic faith will be multiplied and that Christendom will be quit of 
so constant a danger as she has here at her very doors, if these infidels of the kingdom of 
Granada are not uprooted and cast out from Spain."
131
 The Catholic monarchs took full 
advantage of the religious symbolism of their crusade as a defense of all Christendom. They used 
                                                 
127
 The remittance of sin granted to the Southern Italian knights bound for Spain in 1063 closely resembled the 
spiritual privileges that became typical of crusading bulls. Foreign combatants continued to flock to Spanish 
crusades until the final conquest of Granada. See John Edwards, "Reconquista and Crusade in Fifteenth-Century 
Spain," in Crusading in the Fifteenth Century, ed. Norman Housley (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 166. 
128
 Ibid., 170. 
129
 Ibid., 171-72. 
130
 Pope Sixtus IV, "Pope Sixtus IV grants the cruzada to Ferdinand and Isabella for the war against Granada, 10 
August 1482," in Documents on the Later Crusades, 1274-1580, ed. Norman Housley (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1996), 156. 
131
 Gaztambide, "The Holy See and Reconquest of Granada," 362. 
Clark 41 
 
the well-established precedent of papal aid for Reconquista campaigns to successfully lobby 
Pope Sixtus IV for aid in 1482, shortly after the conflict began. The resulting bull of crusade, 
issued on August 10, built on the material aid typified by crusading bulls after 1456, and 
benefited Ferdinand and Isabella so greatly that it was indispensable to their war effort. 
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"Endless money forms the sinews of war." 
Cicero, Phillipics 
 
The Papal Bull of 1482 was far more generous to the Spanish monarchs than previous 
arrangements had been.
132
 The bull offers the traditional plenary indulgences, but greatly 
broadens the participants in the crusade, and in particular the revenue base of the crusade, by 
offering those indulgences not only to combatants but also to financial contributors who donated 
at least two silver reales.
133
 Pope Sixtus IV acknowledged the aims and costs of the crusade in 
the  text of the bull: 
 "Our most dear son in Christ the illustrious king Ferdinand, and our most dear daughter 
Isabella, the queen of Castile and Leon, have begun, partly by our persuasion, to conquer 
the kingdom of Granada, which the perfidious Saracens occupy. They firmly hope and 
trust that, God helping, and all the Spanish kingdoms now being at peace, they may be 
able to achieve the longed-for victory and conquest of the kingdom of Granada which 
their predecessors sought with such zeal, with the conversion of at least some of the 
Saracens to the Catholic faith, and with the permanent release and liberation from 
[Saracen] aggression of the inhabitants of those Christian communities which border on 
the kingdom. We are conscious that the resources of the king and queen are insufficient 
for operations against the kingdom of Granada and for such a great exaltation of the 
faith..."
134
 
 
The Pope echoes Ferdinand and Isabella's hopes that Granada might be conquered once and for 
all, but both parties realized that a mutual agreement was needed if this goal was to be achieved. 
The conquest of Granada would benefit both Spain and Rome, so Sixtus IV invested the Church 
accordingly and granted the Catholic monarchs a décima (tenth) of the revenue collected from all 
ecclesiastical benefices in their kingdoms, although they were initially required to return one-
third of this sum to the Pope for use against the Ottomans.
135
 The Church was in need of funds 
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after the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453, it had incurred many debts in the defense of 
Rhodes and the recapture of Otranto in 1480 and 1481 respectively.
136
 This caveat became a 
point of tension between the papacy and the monarchs throughout the war, as the monarchs 
disliked any portion of the crusading revenues being diverted away from Spain. They accepted 
the condition at first under some duress, eager for papal aid.
137
 However when the pope's envoy 
in Spain, Firmano di Perugia, tried to collect the money for the war effort against the Turks, "he 
encountered systematic opposition, and his attempt to collect the sum agreed upon met with total 
failure."
138
 The Spanish monarchs believed that all of the revenue from the bull of crusade in 
1482 should rightfully be applied to that crusade only, and they chose to ignore promises and 
orders to do otherwise. The monarchs made their position abundantly clear in a letter to the pope 
written in 1485 when the bull of crusade was up for renewal: 
"If our subjects were to learn that part of the money they are giving for the expulsion of 
the infidel is being put to other uses, they would refrain from taking the bull, and so the 
part for the pope's use would be insignificant, and the part left for us so much reduced 
that the emolument we would receive would be very small. If the needs of His Holiness 
are as great as he says, then he has all of Christendom to which to appeal by means of a 
crusade, a tithe, or what he will; for, excepting Hungary, no other country has any reason 
to excuse itself, as we would not excuse ourselves were we not forced to it by 
necessity."
139
 
 
The king and queen employ an economic argument in their letter. All of the revenue from the 
bull of crusade must be spent in Spain, otherwise there will be no revenue at all for either the 
pope or the monarchs. Evidently the financial need of the monarchs was great. They claim that 
they were forced by necessity to excuse themselves from their agreement with the pope; any 
other country except Hungary, which was heavily invested in the conflict with the Turks, should 
be more able to provide money than Spain. 
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 The capture of Ronda in 1485 and the accompanying release of five hundred Christian 
captives gave Ferdinand and Isabella the political leverage they needed in Rome to force the new 
pope, Innocent VIII, to renounce his claim to a third of the décima.
140
 Once the monarchs 
established a monopoly on the décima, they incorporated it as a regular source of income for 
their wars. Authorization for the tithe had to be periodically renewed by the pope, but the 
continued war against Granada and later campaigns against Muslims in North Africa justified the 
renewal of the tithe time after time.
141
 In light of Ferdinand and Isabella's argument that 
misallocation of funds would end the purchase of indulgences, it seems ironic that the décima 
was often spent on projects other than crusade; part of Ferdinand's Italian expedition was 
financed through this line of revenue.
142
 The Catholic monarchs understood the value of the tithe 
on ecclesiastical benefices, and they worked diligently to gain control of the entire tenth set aside 
in the bulls of crusade issued in support for their war against Granada. 
 The crusading bull of 1482 allowed virtually any devout Christian to involve themselves 
in the crusade as a donor. In order to raise both the men and money needed to conquer Granada, 
Sixtus IV felt it necessary to "require and warn all Christ's faithful, particularly those of Spanish 
birth, that they mightily and without ceasing assist, with their goods or in person according to 
their ability, the king and queen in defeating the Saracens, conquering the kingdom of Granada, 
and effecting the exaltation of the faith" (emphasis added).
143
 Each donor could obtain the 
indulgences of the bull according to his or her own means: "if they are cardinals of the Roman 
Church, patriarchs, archbishops and bishops, [they must give] ten ducats; the said king and queen 
one hundred ducats; royal princes and children, together with their wives, ten ducats...those who 
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are so impoverished that their goods amount to no more than sixty ducats, two silver reales, or as 
much as the said treasurers decide."
144
 The very poorest in society could even band together into 
groups large enough to equip one substitute on their behalf, and gain the indulgences for 
themselves as well as the substitute.
145
 While the sentiments of the bull of 1482 recall the peasant 
casting her two pence into the collection plate, the bull did not have its intended effect among the 
lower classes. As the provisions of the bull were renewed year after year, the initial benevolence 
of the laity came to be taken for granted, and the sale of indulgences were eventually included 
under the heading of regular revenues.
146
 Crusading bulls were foisted on the Spanish public 
long after their capacity to give had been exhausted. The Cortes of 1512, a gathering of nobles 
and alcaídes (town officials) that met with the monarchs, complained bitterly about the priests 
who preached the bull of crusade: 
"[They] keep the people in the churches one, two, and three days from morning to 
evening to listen to their sermons, and thus prevent them from earning their daily bread; 
and when they find that they cannot persuade them to take up the said Bull by that means, 
they parade through the streets, asking everyone they meet if he knows his Pater Noster 
and Ave Maria; and if perchance they find one who does not, they force him to take up 
the said Bull as penance; and if anyone refuses, they drag him around in shackles to hear 
their preachments, and thus prevail on him at last by force and threats to take up the said 
Bull."
147
 
 
Such practices may have raised funds for the ultimate glorification of God through the conquest 
of Granada, but they likely did not endear the clergy to the Spanish people. Sellers of inquisitions 
even targeted the deceased as possible sources of revenue, claiming the wills and testaments of 
those recently deceased who had failed to purchase the indulgence were invalid until the heir or 
executor of the estate paid the alleged debt.
148
 Despite the complaints of the Cortes, abuses 
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continued throughout the war as subsequent bulls after 1482 preserved the financial avenue for 
acquiring spiritual indulgences. While the monarchs did little to suppress the abusive sale of 
indulgences, they did at least lead by example by each purchasing an indulgence for one hundred 
florins a piece.
149
 Hernando del Pulgar attributed the donations associated with indulgences as 
one of the sources of the "great sums of money, which were spent on wages and in the other 
things required for the war against the Moors."
150
 Hyperbole aside, the renewal of indulgences 
well into the early sixteenth century - years after the fall of Granada - points to their value as a 
source of income for the monarchs during their wars of conquest. 
 A final source of revenue from the Church that Ferdinand and Isabella enjoyed as a 
matter of right even in times of peace was the tercia real, which amounted to a third of 
ecclesiastical tithes in Spain.
151
 Despite the name of the tax, the royalty actually handed back 
one-third of what they took to fund the construction of parish churches, so their take was actually 
two-ninths of ecclesiastical tithes.
152
 The tercia real was not novel to the reign of Ferdinand and 
Isabella, however they certainly took full advantage of the precedent their forebears set with the 
Church by exercising their claim to this tax. Taxes on commerce remained the primary source of 
income for Spanish kings and queens, however at the 1480 Cortes of Toledo, both sales of the 
Bulla de la Cruzada and the Tercias Reales were listed among the primary sources of public 
revenue.
153
 Ferdinand and Isabella continued to collect the tercia real as a matter of course, and 
one would expect that sales of the bull of crusade would have initially increased in 1482 after the 
capture of Alhama before degenerating into coerced transactions.  
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 The relationship between the Church and the Catholic monarchs exemplifies the way that 
religious and political aspects of the war remained intertwined throughout the conflict. Money 
contributed by the church was meant to address a specific religious problem, the existence of an 
independent Muslim kingdom in Europe. However the revenue from the sale of the bull financed 
the crusade against Granada along with other secular conquests, and as the Catholic monarchs 
came to take the aid of the Church for granted, they began to enter the revenue from the sale of 
the bull directly into the regular royal treasury.
 154
 The bull of crusade issued in 1485 provided a 
direct subsidy of 100,000 Aragonese gold florins in addition to the customary indulgences and 
décima, and only the papal injunction that it be "entirely spent on the holy work of conquering 
the kingdom of Granada and defeating the infidels, and on no other uses," dictated how it was to 
be spent.
155
 Once the funds were in the royal treasury however their expenditure was at the 
discretion of the monarchs, not the Church. 
 While the bulls were renewed long after the fall of Granada, and some of the revenue 
may have been spent on outwardly secular conflicts like the Italian Wars, it is safe to say that the 
Catholic monarchs did spend most of the funds generated by the bulas de la cruzada on the war 
effort against Granada. Treasury documents value the extension of the bula de cruzada at "over 
361 million maravedís (nearly a million ducats)."
156
 Records of the sale of the crusading bull are 
not complete, so the full extent of the financial impact of the bull may never be known. 
Ferdinand and Isabella certainly received hundreds of millions of maravedís. Spanish historian 
M.A. Ladero Quesada estimates that the sale of indulgences as well as the décima amassed a 
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staggering 800 million maravedís for the monarchs between 1482 and 1492.
157
 He asserts that 
"with the money from the crusade [bull] and the tenth, the Crown financed the greater part of the 
war."
158
 Eight hundred million maravedís was not an inconsequential amount - recall that 
Ferdinand and Isabella worked diligently to increase their tax revenue to 26 million reales, or 
approximately 884 million maravedís, per year by 1504. Royal revenues from all sources tripled 
under the Catholic monarchs, however religious subsidization remained invaluable to their war 
efforts, because unlike taxes and other domestic revenue, all of the proceeds could be spent on 
war rather than the repayment of juros or other routine obligations.
159
 
Pope Sixtus IV was eager to help the monarchs in their holy task, and when they 
considered the scope of the task before them, they immediately knew where to seek aid. 
Ferdinand and Isabella drew on centuries of historical support for the Reconquista by the Church 
to gain the capital they needed to conquer Granada. Had Ferdinand not received the aid of the 
church, writes W.T. Walsh, "he would probably have followed the example of several of his 
ancestors; he would have waged a valiant medieval warfare against the Moors, defeated them, 
made the most favorable terms he could with them, then turned to gain an advantage over 
France; then perhaps, at a later, more favorable time, have stuck the Moors again and taken what 
profit he could."
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Final words 
 Ferdinand and Isabella were heroes after the fall of Granada, both with their own 
subjects, and across Christendom. They would keep the lands of Granada, but the glory of the 
conquest was duly shared with God. It was His will that the monarchs followed when they 
rushed to defend Alhama in 1482, and they believed that their diligent service to God allowed 
them to conquer Granada when none of their predecessors had been able to. Ferdinand and 
Isabella's subjects followed their pious sovereigns into battle under the banner of crusade in 
unprecedented numbers. Success was perceived as proof of divine approval, and Ferdinand was 
able to maintain the impetus of his conquest into further international forays. 
 The final conquest of Granada may have reflected divine pleasure with the Catholic 
monarchs; it certainly reflected their aggressive adoption of the most modern military equipment 
and techniques available in Europe at the time. Ferdinand brought an army of conquest into the 
field the likes of which had never been seen in Iberia. It was massive, comprised primarily of 
infantry, and relied on gunpowder artillery to assault fortified defensive positions. Ferdinand's 
infantry became a regular standing force of sorts, and they became ruthlessly efficient with both 
artillery and smaller handguns. All of these developments reflected a broader shift in Europe 
away from feudal warfare towards modern wars of conquest between states and kingdoms. In 
Spain however, these changes were specifically prompted and allowed by the circumstances of 
the Reconquista. 
 No other entity in Europe enjoyed the level of Church support that Castile and Aragón 
did during the crusade against Granada. The Catholic Church subsidized the final campaign of 
the Reconquista by earmarking several sources of income for the struggle which raised hundreds 
of millions of maravedís for the monarchs over the course of the war and beyond. These funds 
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gave Ferdinand and Isabella purchasing power that they would not have otherwise possessed. 
They used the influx of cash to raise missile troops, forge artillery, and hire masters of artillery to 
deploy their guns with deadly efficacy. According to Machiavelli, the monarchs were "able to 
sustain [their] armies with money from the Church and the people and, by means of that long 
war, to lay a good foundation for his standing army, which has subsequently won him 
renown...Under the same cloak of religion he assaulted Africa; he started his campaign in Italy; 
he has recently attacked France."
161
 
  Castile and Aragón emerged from the Reconquista as premier international powers. 
Ferdinand's forces expanded across seas and oceans, and Europe's first transcontinental empire 
was born. The role of the Catholic Church in the Spanish empire is evident in the historical 
record. Modern Northern and Southern American demographics are still profoundly influenced 
by Spanish exploration, conquest, and conversion. What is easier to overlook however is the role 
that the Church played in allowing Castile and Aragón to defeat Granada and flourish in the 
years afterwards. 
 Ferdinand and Isabella took Granada for God. The money they received from the 
Catholic Church was given and spent with sincere conviction. The land won from the Muslims 
however remained in the hands of Ferdinand and Isabella. The many dozens of artillery pieces 
they acquired over a decade of conflict were not beaten into plowshares, but turned instead 
towards the shores of Africa, North America, and even Christian Italy. Men who answered the 
call of God during the crusade against Granada stayed on to fight for king and money under 
Ferdinand's banner in the early years of the sixteenth century. When Granada fell in 1492, the 
prayers of the Catholic monarchs were answered, the desires of God Almighty were appeased, 
and the nature of European warfare was forever changed. 
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